The Apportionment of Cost of Railroad Highway Crossing Improvements in Illinois by Treadway, Hamilton
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 3 Article 2 
June 1941 
The Apportionment of Cost of Railroad Highway Crossing 
Improvements in Illinois 
Hamilton Treadway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hamilton Treadway, The Apportionment of Cost of Railroad Highway Crossing Improvements in Illinois, 19 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 257 (1941). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol19/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
THE APPORTIONMENT OF COST OF RAILROAD HIGH-
WAY CROSSING IMPROVEMENTS IN ILLINOIS
History and Development of the Law in
Illinois Prior to the Passage of the
Public Utilities Act in 1913
HAMILTON TREADWAY
T HE treatment of the subject of apportionment of the cost
of constructing, protecting or eliminating railroad cross-
ings at grade with other public highways, as it has developed
in Illinois, naturally divides itself into two categories: first,
that dealing with the history and development of the law
during the period prior to the passage of the Public Utilities
Act in 1913, and, second, that dealing with the subject under
the provisions of the Public Utilities Act. The division is
appropriate for two obvious reasons: first, because the regu-
lation of railroad-highway grade crossings was shifted in
1913, by the legislature in the enactment of the Public Utili-
ties Act, from the cities and local highway authorities to the
Public Utilities Commission (predecessor of the Illinois Com-
merce Commission), and, second, because roughly speak-
ing, the great changes in the character and nature of high-
way traffic that have taken place since 1913. The present
article will deal with the first of these categories, namely,
the history and development of the law prior to the passage
of the Public Utilities Act in 1913.
The law of apportionment of cost of the construction and
protection of grade crossings in Illinois has developed over
a period of approximately eighty years. A broad outline of
the changes in the character of both highway and railroad
transportation during this period is essential to a discussion
of the evolution of the law. This article will attempt to cover
both of these fields.
Both the railroad and the public streets and ways are
public highways.' In order that confusion may not arise
1 Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. City of Chicago 140 Ill. 309, 29 N.E. 1109
(1892); Galena and Chicago Union R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264 (1859).
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over the use of the expression "public highway" in this
discussion where that term appears hereinafter it will be
used in the restricted sense of a public street, road, or way.
The term will not be used to include railroads. The railroads
will always be referred to as such. Hence, the use of the
term "grade crossing" herein will always refer to the cross-
ing of a railroad by a public street, road, etc., and will not
include the crossing of one railroad by another.2
When the railroads began operating trains in the United
States in 1829, the practice of crossing highways at grade
was inaugurated. There was no particular objection to such
a plan as the number of such crossings was comparatively
few and the travel, both on the railroads and the highways,
was not extensive. Consequently in the early days of the
railroads the question of protecting railroad crossings was
apparently given very little consideration. Obviously pro-
tecting crossings eighty or ninety years ago was not the
important problem that it is today. Nor were the needs and
the reasons for requiring protection the same. In that day
the train movements were slow in comparison with those of
today; the locomotives and cars weighed only a fraction of
what modern equipment does; the trains were short; and,
the railroad grades were heavy and augmented by many
curves.3 On the other hand, the public highways were few
and the number of crossings with railroads was not large.
Too, in that early day the character of the highway traffic
was far different. When railroad building became extensive
in the middle west, during the decade prior to the Civil War,
the highway user often traveled on foot or by horse. Ox carts
and slow moving wagons were the first vehicles. The roads
during much of the year were impassable. The horse-drawn
2 However, the fact that the railroads are public highways must be kept in mind
throughout the entire discussion of the grade crossing problem. This concept is
an important one and where the broad meaning of the term is intended and such
is necessary to an understanding of the discussion that use will be so indicated.
3 Railroad locomotives have increased in weight from between 10 and 25 tons
to between 80 and 300 tons. Freight cars have correspondingly increased in
weight from cars of 10 to 15 tons capacity to cars of 40 to 100 tons capacity. In
the early day of the railroad, trains of 10 cars were the exception. Today 100
car trains are common. From average speeds under 25 miles per hour a half a
century ago, safety devices and improved roadbeds, as well as improved rolling
stock, have made possible increased average speed to well above 50 miles per
hour.
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vehicle was not yet common.4 With conditions on the early
railroads and highways as they were, the ordinary crossing
sign with the well-known legend, "Look Out For The Cars,"
protected the crossing fully as well as the various modern
devices accomplish the same purpose under the changed
conditions of traffic on both the railroads and highways of
today.
Prior to 1850 most of the prairie land of Illinois remained
unturned sod. The construction of railroads with public
aid, during the decade preceding the Civil War, was fol-
lowed by a great wave of migration to these virgin farm
lands. Many hundreds of local roads were constructed to
supplement the transportation system of the railroads.' With
the construction of each mile of new highway and new rail-
road the number of grade crossings increased rapidly.
The close of the Civil War was followed by a period of
farm prosperity, a rapid expansion of industry, and another
wave of migration and immigration, accompanied, as be-
fore, by an enormous growth in the transportation facilities
in the state.7 With the rapid expansion in both the number
of miles of railroad and of highway the number of grade
crossings increased proportionately. The growing impor-
tance of the city of Chicago as a center of trade with its
consequent enormous increase in size further contributed to
the number of such crossings. The substantial growth of
many other municipalities in the state during the last quar-
4 The use of the horse-drawn vehicles increased rapidly after 1870. From that
time until the advent of modern roads after 1913 when the automobile supplanted
the horse and buggy we have a period of nearly half a century during which only
slight changes took place in the character of highway traffic.
5 During the period from 1839 to 1860 there were 2790 miles of railroad con-
structed in Illinois. E. L. Bogert and C. M. Thompson, The Industrial State
(The Centennial History of Illinois, Vol. IV, Ill. Centennial Comm., Springfield,
1920), p. 501. Nearly 2235 miles of this total were built during the six year period
from 1851 to 1856. Arthur Charles Cole, The Era of the Civil War (The Centennial
History of Illinois, Vol. III, Ill. Centennial Comm., Springfield, 1929), p. 46. The
development of the prairie is traced in Bulletin No. 27, Illinois State Geological
Survey, p. 181. See also The History of The Illinois Central Railroad Prior to 1870.
6 During this period, competition between the railroad companies and the
builders of planked highways was keen. By the middle of 1851 some 600 miles
of plank roads had been constructed. Arthur Charles Cole, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 28.
7 The number of miles of railroad increased from 2790 miles in 1860 to 10,213
miles in 1890. More than a third of this increase was completed in the short
period following the Civil War and ending with 1871. E. L. Bogart and C. M.
Thompson, op. cit., (n. 5) p. 501.
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ter of the nineteenth century must not be overlooked." While
the character of the highway traffic during this period re-
mained essentially the same, the speed and frequency of the
train movements changed considerably. Straightening of
curves, improvement of grades, and faster and heavier
equipment increased the speed. Public demand for transpor-
tation increased the length of trains as well as the frequency
of movements. The net effect of these changes was an ever
increasing exposure of the public to the hazards existing at
unprotected grade crossings. The consequent death rate from
grade crossing collisions was appalling.9 The public attention
8 The population of the city of Chicago increased from 298,977 in 1870 to
1,698,575 by 1900, an increase of 1,379,598. The urban population of the remainder
of the state, during the same period, showed an increase of 640,748. At the same
time, there was an increase in the rural population of 261,333. Data taken from
the U. S. Census. There is very little information available on the number of
grade crossings in Illinois during the period prior to 1891. In the latter year the
Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Illinois printed for the first time statis-
tics in its annual report showing the number of grade crossings in the state at
that time. Data from the annual reports of the Railroad & Warehouse Commis-
sion are as follows:
Highway Grade




1906 15,270 No Data
1911 16,101 1,486
The accuracy of much of this data may well be doubted. Extra-polation
however indicates there was an increase of approximately 8000 grade crossings
in Illinois during the period from 1860 to 1890.
9 Data on the number of grade crossing accidents in Illinois appeared for the
first time in the 1890 Annual Report of the Railroad & Warehouse Commission.
That Commission's data reveals:

















Like the data on the number of grade crossings, the accuracy of these
statistics may well be questioned. This is particularly true for the years prior to
260
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thus became focused on the hazardous nature of the grade
crossing. Public demand forced many of the cities of the
state to undertake broad programs of protecting or elimina-
ting such crossings.10 The cities, through self-interest, sought
to place the burden of the costs of these necessary improve-
ments on the railroad. The pursuance of this policy led to
considerable litigation in the courts and was also accom-
panied by several acts of the legislature. A study of the law
as it developed in Illinois after 1870 will reveal the effect of
these factors.
It came to be regarded as the duty of the government
to provide and preserve safe and convenient public high-
ways. From this duty results the right of public control over
public highways. 1 Public crossings necessarily require the
adjustment of two conflicting interests - that of the public
using the highways, and that of the railroads and the public
using them."2
At the common law the railroads owed a duty to the
public using the highways to exercise a reasonable degree
of care for the safety of the public using the highways,
1900. No doubt many accidents occurred at grade crossings which were never
reported to the Commission. However, these data demonstrate a problem of
sufficient magnitude, having in mind the nature and extent of highway traffic,
to require public attention.
10 An example of the activities of the cities may be found in the experience of
the railroads in the city of Chicago. The city of Chicago entered its first track
elevation ordinance, May 23, 1892, against the Illinois Central Railroad. (E. A.
Pratt, American Railways, MacMillan and Co., 1903.) At that time there were
371 grade crossings in the city. By 1899 only two of these remained. The rail-
roads had elevated some 53.65 miles of line, including approaches. This involved
the construction of 278 subways or viaducts, according to the exigencies of the
particular situation. On its part the city vacated the remaining 91 crossings.
(Annual Report of the R. R. & W. Comm., 1899, pages xlii-xlvii.) In his book
Pratt shows somewhat different figures. During the ten-year period from 1892
to 1902 he shows that ordinances were passed by the city of Chicago, requiring
the elevation of some 811.45 miles of track and the construction of 513 subways,
and involving the expenditure of some $33,500,000. By 1902 Pratt says that 251
of the subways had been completed by the elevation of 405.52 miles of track and
involving the expenditure of $22,080,000. The extreme difference in the miles of
track, as shown by Pratt and the Railroad & Warehouse Comm., is partially ex-
plained by the fact that the Commission's figure relates to the number of miles of
line and includes therein one track or ten tracks, as the case may be. Pratt
refers to miles of single track.
11 See footnote 1 supra. Here the term public highway is used in its broad
sense.
12 Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs., 254 U. S. 394, 41 S. Ct. 169,
65 L. Ed. 322 (1921); The Commerce Commission v. The Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago and St. Louis R. Co., 309 Ill. 165, 140 N.E. 868 (1923); Galena and Chicago
Union R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264 (1859).
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consistent with the needs of the public and the circumstances
of the particular situation. Likewise it was the duty of the
public using the highways to exercise due care and diligence
when approaching and crossing a railroad at grade. Legis-
lative enactments requiring installation of protective devices
have not altered these duties, and irrespective of whether
warning signals or other protections have been prescribed
by the legislature the railroad still owes a duty to protect
the public according to the exigencies of the particular situ-
ation. 
13
But at common law the crossing of a new way with one already
in use must be made with the least possible injury to the old way,
and whatever structures are necessary must be erected and maintained
at the expense of the party making the new way, and if the old way
cannot be crossed without damage the damage must be ascertained and
paid.
14
Thus the common law required the railroad to provide
and maintain an adequate crossing at any point where it cut
through an existing highway. In an early Illinois case 5
the city of Bloomington had constructed a viaduct or bridge
across the railroad tracks, eliminating a dangerous grade
crossing. The viaduct had fallen into a state of disrepair and
the city sought to compel the railroad to reconstruct and
thereafter maintain the structure. The company argued that
the viaduct was a new crossing and that the duty of the com-
pany to provide a safe and adequate crossing extended only
' 13Wagner v. Toledo, Peoria, & Western R. Co., 352 Ill. 85, 185 N.E. 236 (1933).
In this case the company contended it was not required to maintain warning
signs at crossings except where required by the Commission and that the record
failed to show any order requiring warning signs at this crossing. The court
said at page 90: "But regardless of the situation produced by the failure to
prove an order of the commission, there is a common-law duty devolving upon
railroads to exercise such care and use such precautions as will enable the
traveler on the highway, if he exercises ordinary care, to ascertain in the night-
time the approach of a train over a street crossing such as the testimony shows
this one to have been. Special conditions creating special hazards at crossings
require a watchman, gates, or other warning to travelers." Opp v. Pryor, 294
Ill. 538, 541, 128 N.E. 580 (1920); Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Dillon, 123 Ill. 570,
15 N.E. 181 (1888); Licha v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 201 Minn. 427, 276 N.W.
813 (1937). For a discussion of the respective duties of the railroad and the
public see also Toledo, Wabash & Western R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill.
37 (1873): Galena and Chicago Union R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264 (1859); note, 71
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 153 (1923).
14 Boston & Albany R. Co. v. City of Cambridge, 159 Mass. 283, 34 N.E. 382
(1893).
15 The People ex rel. v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 67 Ill. 118 (1873). This case
will be referred to as the first Bloomington case.
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to the original grade crossing. The following discussion at
page 119 of the opinion of the court is pertinent:
It is a well settled principle of the common law, resting upon the
most obvious considerations of justice, that any person or corporation
that cuts through a highway for the benefit of such person or corpora-
tion, must furnish to the public a proper crossing, even though acting
under a license from the proper authorities. We refer, of course, to
cases where the legislative power has not, in terms, relieved the per-
son or company that interferes with a highway, from the necessity
of removing any obstructions they may create. In the absence of such
an express provision, it is palpable that a railway company is under
obligation to leave every highway that it crosses in a safe condition
for the use of the public. 16
In an earlier Illinois 1'7 case the court held that where the
railroad had cut through a highway and the peril of the cros-
sing could have been avoided by the railway going under the
highway, if the highway could be restored in a manner not
to impair its usefulness only in that way, it was the duty of
the railroad to carry the highway over the railway by means
of a viaduct. In this case the railroad ran through a deep
cut between two hills. The highway came down to the tracks
on either side through cuts in the hill. The railroad ran down
grade toward the west in the vicinity of the crossing. These
physical surroundings obstructed the view of approaching
trains and permitted trains to glide noiselessly down the
grade from the east without warning to the highway user.
The court held that a failure of the railroad to construct an
overhead bridge in this situation was a breach of its duty to
restore the highway in such manner as to furnish a proper
crossing.
The court never extended the common law rule beyond
the limitations imposed by these two early cases. By 1876 it
was searching for other reasons for limiting the duty of the
railroads. In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. The City
of Bloomington8 the city sought to compel the railroad to
10 Ibid. With reference to the contention of the railroad that the viaduct was
a new crossing and thus fell within the common-law rule, the court held that
the viaduct was but the substitution of one type of crossing for another. Since
this had been done with the full concurrence of the railroad, the new crossing,
so far as concerned its liability, stood in the place of the old.
17 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Payne, Adm'r, 59 Ill. 534 (1871),
This case will be referred to as the Payne case.
18 76 Ill. 447 (1875). This case will be referred to as the second Bloomington
case.
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pay for the construction of a new grade crossing formed by
the extension of a new street over the railroad's right-of-way.
The court held that such burden could not be imposed on the
railroad. This conclusion of the court was based on the
theory that the corporation was an artificial person and
could be subjected to no greater burden than could be im-
posed on a natural person. The court drew the following
analogy:
Suppose a natural person had the right of way across his neighbor's
grounds, and afterwards the city were to locate and open a street
across his right of way, does any one suppose the owner of the right
of way could be compelled, by legislative enactment, or an ordinance in
pursuance thereto,19 to construct the crossing of the street at his own
expense, even if his use of the right of way would render the use of the
street impracticable or dangerous until the approaches should be con-
structed? We presume no one would contend for the power in that case.
And why? Because it would impose an unequal and unjust burden on
the owner of the right of way that, in spirit, would be the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation, which must
be paid under the constitution.
20
Thus we see that the court was not only unwilling to ex-
tend the common law doctrine beyond those crossings which
were formed by the intersection of the railroad with high-
ways existing at the time of the laying out and construction
of the railroad but that it sought to find a constitutional rea-
son to justify its position. The court recognized that the legis-
ture could, by general law, require all railroads constructed
subsequent to such enactment to construct and maintain
crossings at all highways thereafter laid out and opened
across its line.2' But the court in the second Bloomington
case did not conceive that the legislative power extended to
19 The charter of the city of Bloomington gave the city the power to require
railroad companies to construct and maintain grade crossings of streets within
the city limits. Pursuant to this power the city enacted an ordinance requiring
the construction of the crossing in question.
20 Illinois Central R. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 76 Ill. 447, 451 (1875). The
second Bloomington case.
21 Ibid., at page 449 it was said: "And it is equally true that, if their charters
were to contain a provision that they should so construct crossings over roads
and streets subsequently located and opened, such a provision would be binding.
And if the General Assembly were to provide, by general law, that railroad
companies should make and keep up such structures at crossings when the
road is built, as well as those that might be thereafter laid out and opened, all
railroads subsequently constructed would be compelled to conform to the re-
quirement unless exempted by their charters."
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an imposition of this burden on those railroads constructed
prior to the exercise of the legislative will.
The illustration used by the court as an analogy is inept
and fails to recognize the principle that the railroads as
well as the public roads and streets are public highways,
while a private right of way across private lands is but a
private way.2 2 This illustration also fails to recognize the
reciprocal relation existing at public crossings between the
public using the highway and the railroads and the public
using them. The railroad has the same but no better right
to cross a public highway with their trains, at the point of
intersection with their road, than the highway user has to
cross their tracks at the same place. These rights are mutual
and coextensive. 23 This illustration further fails to recognize
that where the use of the railroad renders the use of the
crossing by the general public inherently dangerous the form-
er must yield to regulation in the interest of the latter. Yet
four years earlier the court said:
The state has reserved to itself the power to enact all police laws
necessary and proper to secure and protect the life and property of
the citizen. Prominent amongst the rights reserved, and which must
inhere in the state, is the power to regulate the approaches to and
the crossings of public highways, and the passage through cities and
villages, where life and property are constantly in imminent danger by
the rapid and fearful speed of railway trains. The exercise of their
franchises by corporations must yield to the public exigencies and the
safety of the community.
2 4
A year later the court said:
There can be no question that railway corporations are subject to
police regulations as well as private citizens. The general assembly,
when the public exigencies require it, has power to regulate corporations
in their franchises so as to provide for the public safety. . . .This
power is inherent in the State, and it can not part irrevocably with
its control over that which is for the health, safety and welfare of
society.25
In the same opinion it was urged that it was the rail-
road's work which rendered the public crossings danger-
ous, and hence it was they who might "be compelled to
22 This principle was recognized and discussed in the early case of Galena and
Chicago Union R. Co. v. Dill, 22 ll1. 264 (1859).
23 Ibid.
24 Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw R. Co. v. Deacon, 63 1M. 91, 93 (1872).
25 Toledo, Wabash & Western R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Il. 37. 40 (1873).
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bear the expenses of such measures as may be adopted to
secure the lives and property of those who have an equal
right with them to the use of the crossing on the highway."26
It is difficult to reconcile these cases with the views ex-
pressed by the court in the second Bloomington case. Per-
haps the groping of the court during this early period can
be partially explained by a review of the legislative history
of the problem. The present Constitution, adopted in 1870,
requires all corporations to be chartered under a general
act of incorporation and condemns acts chartering indivi-
dual corporations, as being special legislation. This was not
true of the Constitution of 1848. Because of the nature of the
interests involved, most of the early railroads were organ-
ized under special charters. A general act for the incorpora-
tion of railroads was enacted in 1849 only after some con-
siderable opposition.27 Among the powers granted to the
corporations organized under this act the following are signi-
ficant:
Section 21. Every such corporation shall possess the general powers,
and be subject to the general liabilities and restrictions expressed in
the special powers following....
5. To construct their road upon or across any stream of water,
water course, road, highway, railroad, or canal, which the route of
its road shall intersect; but the corporation shall restore the . . . road or
highway, thus intersected, to its former state, or in a sufficient man-
ner not to have impaired its usefulness.
2s
The general railroad incorporation act of 1871 repeated this
provision and added that the railroad shall "keep such
crossing in repair. "29
The acts of 1849 and 1871 provided further that "all
existing railroad corporations within this State shall re-
spectively have and possess all the powers and privileges,
and be subject to the duties and liabilities and provisions
contained in this act. . ".3.0, In an early case3 1 the court con-
26 Ibid., p. 42.
27 Arthur Charles Cole, op. cit., (n. 5), Ch. II.
28 Laws, 1849, 16th General Assembly, 2nd session, p. 20.
29 Laws, 1871, p. 631.
50 Laws, 1849, 2nd session, p. 28, § 45 of "An act to Provide for a general sys-
tem of railroad incorporations." See also p. 633 of the Laws of Illinois, 1871.
81 Galena & Chicago Union R. Co. v. Loomis, 13.11. 548 (1852).
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strued this act as applicable to a railroad created by special
charter as well as those companies organized thereunder.32
The act of 1849 also provided that "whenever the track
of said railroad shall cross a road or highway, such road or
highway may be carried under or over the track, as may be
found most expedient .... 1
These acts were in effect at the time of the decisions in
the Bloomington and Payne cases. Although not cited by
the court the rules laid down in these cases are so similar
to the statute that the conclusion cannot escape us but that
this statute influenced these opinions.
In 1869 the legislature passed an act "to protect lives
and property of persons at railway crossings of the public
highways." Section 1 of this act provided that,
at all the railroad crossings of the public highways of this state out-
side the corporate limits of the cities and villages, the several rail-
road companies of this state shall erect, construct and maintain the
same, and the approaches thereto within their respective rights of
way, so that at all times they shall be safe as to lives of persons and
property. 34
It is plain that this act confined the obligation to con-
struct and maintain new crossings to those outside of the
limits of cities and villages. Presumably those crossings in-
side such limits were to be constructed and maintained by
the municipal authorities. 5 This statute may have had some
bearing on the decision in the second Bloomington case.
In 1874 the legislature imposed on the railroads an act
in relation to fencing and operating railroads which among
other things required that
at all of the railroad crossings of highways and streets in this state,
the several railroad corporations in this state shall construct and main-
32 In the introduction to J. H. Gordon's paper on "Illinois Railway Legislation
and Commission Control Since 1870," Prof. M. B. Hammond says: "In spite of
the fact that a general incorporation act was passed by the Legislature in 1849, the
practice of granting special charters continued, and no road was actually incor-
porated under a general law until after 1870. The reason for neglecting to take
advantage of the general incorporation act of 1849 seems to have been that any
road organized under its provisions must still obtain from the legislature specific
permission to condemn land, thus necessitating a special act for each road."
University of Illinois Studies I, 209, 220.
33 See Laws, 1849, § 25, p. 24.
34 Laws of Illinois, 1869, p. 312.
35 Chicago & North Western R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 140 Ill. 309, 320, 29 N.E.
1109 (1892).
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tain said crossings, and the approaches thereto, within their respective
rights of way, so that at all times they shall be safe as to persons
and property.
3 6
This act was nothing more than an exercise of the police
power of the state. Public security, both as to persons and
to property, was its object. It was so recognized by the
courts.
In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Willenborg
37 it
was said:
This point is made, however, that these provisions are not obligatory
on this corporation, because they were enacted many years since it
received its charter from the State. This is a misapprehension of the
law. The regulations . . . are police regulations in the strict sense of
those terms, and apply with equal force to corporations whose tracks
are already built, as well as those to be thereafter constructed.
In Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. City
of Chicago,"5 the city sought to open a new street across the
railroad's right of way. In the condemnation proceeding the
railroad contended this act did not compel the railroad to
construct and maintain new crossings and sought damages
for the construction of the crossing, and approaches thereto,
and for the maintenance of a watchman to operate the
necessary gates. It was not contended by the railroad that
the city lacked the power to open said crossing 9 but only
that the railroad should not be required to bear the burden
of constructing and maintaining the crossing.
With reference to the contention that the act did not
require the railroad to construct new crossings it was held
that the word "construct" involved the idea of building for
the first time. It was said that an existing crossing could be
36 Although on the statute books at the time of the decision in the second Bloom-
ington case this act was enacted after the case arose and therefore could not have
been considered in the decision of the court. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939, Ch. 114, § 62.
37 117 Il. 203, 208, 7 N.E. 698 (1886).
38 See Note 35, supra.
89 A railroad takes its right of way subject to the right of the public to extend
public highways and streets across such right of way. In Chicago & Alton R. Co. v.
Joliet, Lockport & Aurora R. Co., 105 Ill. 388, 401 (1883), it was said: "Unless.
therefore, every railroad corporation takes its right of way subject to the right of
the public to have other roads, both common highways and railways, constructed
across its track whenever the public exigency might be thought to demand it, the
grant of the privilege to construct a railroad across or through the state would be
an obstacle in the way of its future prosperity of no inconsiderable magnitude."
This right is independent of whether the railroad owns the fee or merely holds an
easement. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. City of Pontiac, 169 Ill. 155, 48 N.E. 485 (1897).
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maintained, but that it was an inaccuracy to speak of
constructing that which was already constructed. The court
said:
There is no reason for supposing, that the legislature intended to
refer exclusively to a railroad crossing, created by running a new rail-
road across an existing street. The language includes also a railroad
crossing, created by running a new street across an existing railroad. 40
Thus construed the act was in derogation of the common
law rule to which the court had previously adhered.
The end sought to be attained by an exercise of the
police power must be reasonable and have some rational
relation to the evil sought to be eradicated. If the exercise
of the police power is reasonable, neither a natural per-
son nor a corporation can claim damages on account of being
compelled to render obedience to a regulation thus designed
to secure the common welfare. This proposition is well set-
tled and requires no array of authority to establish its sound-
ness. It is equally true that uncompensated obedience to a
regulation enacted for the public safety under the police
power is not a taking of property without just compensation.41
These principles were recognized by the court and it
held that the items of expense for which the railroad sought
compensation from the city of Chicago were only such as
are involved in complying with a police regulation of the
statute. The court held: "It is proper, that the portion of the
street or highway which is within the limits of the railroad
right of way should be constructed by the railroad com-
pany and maintained by it, because of the dangers attending
the operation of its road."4 2
In a later case43 the court affirmed its holding and was
affirmed on an appeal taken to the United States Supreme
Court. That court said in part:
We concur in these views. The expenses that will be incurred by the
40 See note 35, supra, p. 320.
41 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Joliet, Lockport & Aurora R. Co., n. 39, supra.
42 "The frequency with which trains pass and repass at such places renders the
dangers to be apprehended constantly imminent, and the legislature may so de-
clare and make it obligatory on the company to adopt measures to secure the
public safety. The rights of the company and the public to the use of the crossing
are mutual, but it is the duty of the company to provide the proper safeguards,
and the degree of diligence must be in proportion to the hazard." Toledo, Wabash
& Western R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 41 (1873).
43 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 149 Ill. 457, 37 N.E.
78 (1894).
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railroad company in erecting gates, planking the crossing, and main-
taining flagmen, in order that its road may be safely operated-if
all that should be required,-necessarily result from the maintenance of
a public highway, under legislative sanction and must be deemed to
have been taken by the company into account when it accepted the
privileges and franchises granted by the State. Such expenses must be
regarded as incidental to the exercise of the police power of the State. 44
While the city was bound to make compensation for that which was
actually taken, it cannot be required to compensate the defendant for
obeying lawful regulations enacted for the safety of the lives and
property of the people.
45
It is difficult to reconcile this doctrine with that advanc-
ed in the earlier cases, particularly the second Bloomington
case. The great changes in the nature and volume of the
railroad traffic, the increasing importance of the public
highways to the prosperity and growth of the state, the
consequent increase in grade crossing accidents, followed
as they were by a focusing of the public attention on the
problems involved, doubtless influenced the court, for there
is little difference between the language of the charter of
the city of Bloomington46 under which it attempted to re-
quire the railroad to bear the burden of the construction of
a crossing of a street newly laid out across its right of way
and the language of the act of 1874 under which the city of
Chicago was held to have such power. The decisions in
other jurisdictions no doubt carried their weight.
4 7
44 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 at p.
255, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1896).
45 Ibid, 166 U. S. 226 at p. 256.
46 The provisions of this charter are summarized in note 19, supra. Sec. 1, par.
26 of Art. V of the Cities and Villages Act of 1872 also provided: "To require rail-
road companies . . . to construct . . .crossings of streets and public roads, and
keep the same in repair ......
47 Thorpe v. The Rutland & Burlington R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1854); People v. Boston
& Albany R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569 (1877); Boston & Maine R. Co. v. County of York,
79 Me. 386, 10 A. 113 (1887).
Much of the confusion found in the early decisions of the courts in this country
may be traced to the early decision in the Old Colony and Fall River R. Co. v.
County of Plymouth, 14 Gray 155 (Mass., 1859). In this case, without mentioning
the common-law rule, the court held the railroad entitled to damages for the ex-
penses of erecting and maintaining signs, as required by law at the crossings, for
making and maintaining cattle guards, and for planking and maintaining the
roadway over the crossing, but denied items of increased liability from personal
injury actions and expenses attendent on the ringing of bells, as required by law.
At the time of this case, but not cited by the court, the statutes of that state pro-
vided:
"If, after the laying out and making of a railroad, the public convenience and
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The doctrine of uncompensated obedience to the police
power thus developed in Illinois was a rule of apportion-
ment of cost. It soon found expression in a majority of the
jurisdictions in this country. 8 It applied with equal force
to the construction of subways or viaducts as to the construc-
tion of grade crossings. True it is that the Illinois cases
cited relate only to the construction and protection of grade
crossings. However, it is but a step from requiring a rail-
road to furnish flagmen, gates, and warning signs and sig-
nals, all of which are in the nature of protection, to requiring
the railroad to build a subway or viaduct. A viaduct or sub-
way is but a safety device made necessary by the exigencies
of the situation.40
The act of 1874 did not limit the word "crossing" to those
necessity require a turnpike road or other way to be laid out across it, such road
or way may be so laid out and established when the county commissioners so
authorize and direct, and all expenses of, and incident to, constructing and main-
taining the road or way at such crossing, shall be borne by the county, city, town
or corporation owning the same."
The decision in the Old Colony case was not a well reasoned opinion and but
for the existence of this statute would be difficult to explain, although the court
in the Cambridge case, supra, attempts to do so on the basis of the English com-
mon-law rule. A careful consideration of the history of the common-law rule and
the nature of the growth of the common law as a system as well as the background
of the Old Colony case might have led the judges to a different result. However,
it was not until many years later that such an analysis was made by the court in
Minnesota. See: State ex rel. v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R. Co., 98 Minn.
380, 108 N.W. 261 (1906).
The Old Colony case was relied on by counsel in the early Illinois cases but the
existence of the Massachusetts statute was never pointed out. No doubt the case
had some effect on the decisions although not cited by the court.
The reader may find of interest the fact that the theory of deodands, which re-
quired forfeiture to the king of the thing causing the death of a person, was abil-
ished by act of Parliament in England in 1846. This was about the time that the
railroad was becoming common in that country.
48 Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Shelley, 163 Ind. 36, 71 N.E. 151 (1904); Illi-
nois Central R. Co. v. Copiah County, 81 Miss. 685, 33 So. 502 (1903); State v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 29 Neb. 412, 45 N.W. 469 (1890); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 418, 72 N.W. 1118 (1897).
Contra, see Kansas Central R. Co. v. Board of County Com'rs., 45 Kan. 716, 26
P. 394 (1891); Boston & Albany R. Co. v. City of Cambridge, 159 Mass. 283, 34 N.E.
382 (1893); In re City of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids & Indiana R. Co., 66 Mich.
42, 33 N.W. 15 (1887).
In Kansas the court later held that this decision was no longer controlling be-
cause of legislative enactments. State Highway Com'n. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., 139 Kan. 185, 29 P. (2d) 1104 (1934). The Massachusetts rule is ex-
plained by the statute quoted in note 47, supra. The Michigan case recognized a
distinction between those expenses made necessary by the highway construction
and those required to comply with police regulations. Where the division is to be
made is not clear.
49 State ex rel. v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R. Co., n. 47, supra.
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at grade, and, unless the term were so limited, the act would
apply with equal force to crossings by viaduct or subway if
the exigencies of the case required.
That the state in the exercise of the police power could
require the railroad to build subways or viaducts was shortly
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States.50
Thereafter it was never questioned in Illinois." This per-
haps may be traced to the fact that the companies had them-
selves come to realize that they could not possibly continue
to operate their systems in a way which involved a very
great risk to the public as well as a substantial interference
with their own operations. The elevation of tracks, particu-
larly in the cities permitted the speeding up of traffic, a
much demanded improvement of the time. Certainly the
elimination of these crossings had some effect on the death
rate at grade crossings in the state although the number of
deaths continued to increase. 52 The general effect of cross-
ing elevations on the welfare of the community was express-
ed by the Illinois court in Summerfield v. Chicago, 3 as
follows:
The great advantage to the public to be attained by the elevation
of the tracks of railroads at street intersections of a city is too mani-
fest to be questioned. Not only public convenience and the business of
the community are advanced by the elevation, of the tracks, but that
50 New York & New England R. Co. v. Town of Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 14 S. Ct.
437, 38 L. Ed. 269 (1894). This case has been followed in a long line of authorities.
51 Several cases have been decided on collateral issues where the power of the
city to compel the construction of viaducts or subways has been recognized. See
particularly the following:
Summerfield v. City of Chicago, 197 II. 270, 64 N.E. 490 (1902); People ex rel. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 R. Co., 217 Ill. 594, 75 N.E. 573 (1905); Weage v.
Chicago & Western Indiana R. Co., 227 Ill. 421, 81 N.E. 424 (1907); People ex rel.
v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 232 Ill. 292, 83 N.E. 839 (1908); City of Chicago v.
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 244 Inl. 220, 91 N.E. 422 (1910);
Murphy v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 247 Ill. 614, 93 N.E. 381 (1910).
52 See note 9, supra. The accuracy of the data available is so questionable as to
render any calculation of the death rate per thousand grade crossings of doubtful
value. However, combining the data in notes 8 and 9, supra, indicates that there
were 8.57 deaths per 1,000 grade crossings in Illinois in 1891. By 1896 the figure had
decreased to 6.84. In 1901 it was up to 7.26. With a drop in the number of fatalities
to 98 in 1906 the deaths per thousand grade crossings fell to 6.42. The death per
thousand grade crossings is not of course a proper criterion of the effectiveness
of grade crossing protection and elimination. A more accurate index would be
the deaths per thousand vehicle crossings, including therein the number of
vehicle crossings made at grade and by viaduct or subway. Data to determine
this factor is not, and may never be, available.
53 197 II. 270, 272, 64 N.E. 490 (1902).
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which is by far the more important, the citizen is secured from the
many dangers which imperil life and limb where trains of railroad
cars cross street intersections at grade.
The act of 1874 has been superseded by Section 58 of
the Public Utilities Acts of 1913 and 1921.11 The latter acts
transferred to the Illinois Commerce Commission, and its
predecessors, the power of the cities and local authorities
over the crossings formed by the intersection of the rail-
roads with streets and highways.55 This act delegated to
the Commission the power to apportion between the railroads
and public authorities the cost of improving and protecting
crossings of the railroads with the public streets and high-
ways. The power thus granted is an exercise of the police
power of the state.56 No criterion is prescribed by the legis-
lature for the exercise by the Commission of this power. It
is therefore subject only to the limitations imposed by law,
including the constitution, statutes, and the common law.
This article has been devoted to tracing the history and
evolution of the law prior to 1913. It can be fairly said that
the only criterion which the rules developed during this
period leave the Commission is that the apportionment shall
not be arbitrary and unreasonable, that is, shall have some
reasonable relation to the evil sought to be eradicated, and
that in a proper case, where the exigencies require, railroad
property may be subjected to uncompensated obedience to
regulations imposed in the interest of the public safety. These
standards are abstract and difficult of application. They
leave the Commission with a problem made more intricate
by the changes of time. The investigation of the manner
in which this problem has been met by the Commission
must be the subject of another article.
54 Wagner v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co., 352 Ill. 85, 185 N.E. 236 (1933).
55 City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission, ex rel., 356 Ill. 501, 190
N.E. 896 (1934).
56 Ibid.
